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Abstract 
Children’s understanding of race constancy and their subsequent use of race as a 
means of drawing inductive inferences were investigated. Race constancy was 
determined by children’s tendency to say that people could change category 
membership by changing their outside appearance. A second phase of the study 
measured how many race-based inferences children made relative to other social 
categories such as age or sex.  The results indicated that children who had a better 
understanding of race constancy were also more likely to use race as a means of 
drawing inductive inferences. These findings support a developmental progression of 
race constancy and give insight to the development of potential bias and stereotypes.             
 
 
 
 vii
 Introduction 
Categorization is one of the fundamental cognitive processes by which people 
make sense of the world. Among other applications, categories prevent us from treating 
each individual object or event as an entirely unique and unknown entity, categories help 
us to communicate with and comprehend others, and they also permit us to form 
expectations or draw inferences about unfamiliar objects and events. Without the ability 
to categorize things based on shared characteristics, every person, object, event, and 
experience would be viewed as individual entities making the world incomprehensible. 
Instead, categorization provides humans with the ability to reduce the complexity of the 
world into a manageable and efficient system that allows us to make inferences about 
new objects that we encounter (Gelman, 1988).  
Although we know people have to categorize incoming information, researchers 
still do not fully understand the process by which categories are formed. For the first half 
of the twentieth century, psychological approaches to category formation took a 
definitional approach called the classical view. This theoretical model argues that every 
object is ether “A” or “not A” with no in-between cases. Furthermore, the classical view 
did not make any distinction between category members. Anything that meets the 
definition is just as good a category member as anything else (Murphy, 2002). The 
empirical and theoretical work during the 1970s led by Eleanor Rosch argued against the 
classical view (Gil-White, 2001). Researchers argued that the classical view could not 
explain the conceptual representations that humans might use to form the basis of 
classification. In real life, there are many things that cannot be discretely determined as 
belonging to one category or another. For example, is a tomato a fruit or vegetable? 
Researchers argued that each category has a prototype that best represents that category, 
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and the classical view does not account for this possibility. The classical view has since 
been replaced in popularity with the prototype and exemplar theories, which are strongly 
unclassical in nature and can account for the conceptual representations that humans use 
to form categories (Murphy, 2002).         
There are three types of conceptual representations that humans might use to form 
the basis of classification: nominal kinds, artifacts, and natural kinds. This project will 
only focus on the last two. Artifacts are objects that are constructed by humans, and 
consequently are defined in terms of their function, rather their internal structure 
(Gelman, 1988). Examples include birdfeeders, buckets, airplanes, and tape recorders. 
According to Schwartz (1979), a “natural kind” is any object that is defined entirely by its 
underlying properties. These underlying properties can be considered the “essence” of the 
object they represent. Gelman and Markman (1987) state that “natural kinds have a deep, 
non-obvious basis” and also “natural kinds capture theory-based properties rather than 
superficial features” (p.1532-1533). Plants, animals, or other naturally occurring objects 
are examples of natural kinds. For example, the underlying properties (i.e., essence) 
create a belief of what a “bird” should be and therefore allow humans to draw inferences 
based upon these beliefs. The idea that humans use an object’s essence to define, classify, 
or draw inferences about the object is what Medin and Ortony (1989) termed 
“psychological essentialism.” Whether or not an essence actually exists within the object 
is irrelevant, instead, what is crucial is that humans actually believe an essence exists and 
consequently use it in order to form categories (Medin & Ortony, 1989).  Because these 
beliefs are based on conceptual or internal characteristics rather than perceptual or 
external characteristics, research suggests that many people tend to treat natural 
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categories as fixed and unchanging regardless of dramatic changes in appearance (Keil, 
1989).     
A body of research has shown that adults tend to essentialize natural categories, 
meaning they categorize objects based upon non-obvious properties, which they consider 
unchanging and constant (Keil, 1989). Do children also treat natural kinds in a way that is 
consistent with psychological essentialism? Keil (1989) presented children in 
kindergarten, second, and fourth grade with a series of stories and pictures describing 
various physical changes to several animals. For example, various changes were 
described about a raccoon that eventually caused it to resemble a skunk (for example, 
dyed black, bleached white strip, given an odor). Keil found that like adults, children 
agreed that animal categories remained fixed regardless of external transformations. 
These results also showed an age-related increase in children’s willingness to say animals 
could not change categories. The data showed that the older the participants were, the 
more likely they were to say that animals could not change category membership. From 
this research, it seems that young children understand that animal categories reflect more 
than external features and include deeper non-obvious properties as well (Diesendruck, 
Gelman, & Lebowitz, 1998). Finally, Gelman and Markman (1986) found that similar to 
adults, children also drew inductive inferences about novel stimuli based upon the 
animal’s presumed essence. This body of research provides evidence that children do 
view animal categories in a way consistent with “psychological essentialism.”  
Because humans are considered animals (i.e., natural kinds) researchers over the 
last few years have questioned to what extent adults view human categories as having 
essences. Anthropologist Gil-White (2001) verbally asked three questions to 59 
participants from the Torgouud territory in Mongolia to determine whether they viewed 
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ethnicity in a way consistent with “psychological essentialism.” Gil-White told 
participants about a Kazakh couple who had a child they did not want. At a very young 
age, the child was given up for adoption to a Mongol family. The child was never told of 
the adoption and grew up learning only Mongol customs. Participants were then asked 
what is the ethnicity of the child. Gil-White found that participants were more likely to 
say that the child would continue to be the ethnicity to which he/she was born. As 
mentioned, this study is not a traditional psychological study, thus its findings while 
insightful, should be interpreted with caution when applied to the field of psychology. 
Madole, Keleman, Glerum, and Webb (1999) presented 76 adults a series of twelve 
stories describing changes to people, animals, and artifacts. Each story was accompanied 
by a before and after transformation picture of the target object. Subjects were then asked 
to indicate to which category membership these stimuli belonged. Madole et al. found 
that adults essentialized race as much as animal species, and, even more surprising, adults 
were more likely to say that humans could change their sex than their race.  
For the purpose of this project, two important conclusions can be drawn from 
these research findings: 1) Because humans are seen as natural kinds, they remain fixed 
in their respective category regardless of transformations to external appearance, and 2) 
humans defined as natural kinds have a presumed essence about them that can then serve 
as a tool for drawing inductive inferences about how members of that category may 
behave (Murphy, 2002). Although we know that adults view race in a manner consistent 
with these conclusions, we have not yet explored the nature of children’s views regarding 
race. Therefore, do children view race in the same way, thus essentializing race and 
believing inferences can be made from race? Two opposing bodies of literature will be 
reviewed to examine this question in further detail. 
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 Researchers have debated to what extent children’s view of race is similar to that 
of adults. At what age do children acquire the belief that race remains constant regardless 
of external transformations? Is this idea something that appears during infancy or does 
this idea of an internal “essence” develop as children grow older? Researchers on one 
side of the debate have argued that young children gradually develop racial categories 
relying on perceptual cues rather than essentializing properties like adults (Aboud, 1988; 
Semaj, 1980). According to this view, children do not understand that race is related to 
abstract qualities, so their reasoning about race involves associating similarities rather 
than conceptually based categorization. Aboud (1988) reports that while adults think of a 
person’s race as something that is inherited from his/her parents, children do not 
comprehend inheritance at an early age and are fooled by external features. Not only are 
children fooled by external features, Ramsey (1987) suggests that preschool children 
believe these racial features are temporary and changeable, caused by environmental 
conditions (for example, the tanning effects of the sun).   
Correctly applying an ethnic label or identifying which doll goes with a given 
ethnic label is a common way to measure children’s understanding of racial categories. 
Aboud (1988) reviewed various studies demonstrating that a significant proportion of 
children at 4 and 5 years of age can identify different ethnic groups fairly accurately, but 
it is not until age 6 and 7 the children reach close to 100% percent accuracy especially in 
identifying Black and White. Semaj (1980) argued that until minimal skills for 
classifying people according to their ethno-racial group are achieved, children would not 
be able to achieve racial constancy. As children’s cognitive processing of racial 
information changes developmentally so does their ability to classify according to racial 
categories. Semaj (1980) asked African-American children three hypothetical questions 
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about the possibility of a child changing his or her race. For example, “Can a Black child 
become a White child if he or she really wants to?”; “Can a Black child become a White 
child if he or she changes the color of his or her skin with white makeup?”; and “Can a 
Black child become a White child if he or she changes the color of his or her skin with 
white makeup and puts on a white wig?” Semaj found that only 20% of 4-5 year-olds 
“knew” that a Black person could not become a White and 40% of the oldest children in 
the study (10-11) consistently said that race was unchangeable. Semaj’s results 
demonstrate that preschool children understand that people are classified into different 
racial categories, but do not fully understand the reasons or permanence of these 
groupings until around age 9 or 10. Furthermore, complete mastery may not occur until 
the child is beyond age eleven suggesting a gradual development of racial constancy. 
Further evidence in favor of children’s increasing cognitive understanding of race is their 
understanding of the cause of skin color. Research by Clark, Hocevar, and Dembo (1980) 
tested the extent to which children understood what causes a persons skin to be a certain 
color. Subjects were asked, “How is it that this person is white” or “How is it that this 
person is black.” Researchers found that around age 7, children were aware that there 
were physical origins of a person’s skin color; however, children did not make the link to 
the parents until after age 7.     
Glerum (2002) replicated the methodology used by Madole et al. (1999) to 
examine whether children essentialized race in the same manner as adults. Glerum 
presented preschoolers, 2nd, and 4th graders stories adopted from Madole et al., (1999).  
Race stories introduced a person of either black or white appearance. The target was 
described as looking and acting like “most Black/White boys/girls” while growing up. A 
visit to the doctor was then described, during which the physician changed the external 
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characteristics of the target to resemble the opposite ethnicity. Pictures followed each 
story of the target’s supposed biological parents or neighbors, a picture of the target 
before visiting the doctor, and a post transformation picture. Glerum found that older 
children were more resistant to the idea that a person could change racial categories than 
younger children. Fourth graders were more likely than 2nd graders and preschool 
children to indicate that race was constant regardless of changes in external 
characteristics. This evidence supports the idea that a cognitive shift takes place between 
2nd and 4th grade, which causes children to view race as a constant with more 
essentializing properties.  
The other side of the debate argues that children do in fact have an adult-like, 
“common-sense,” theory of race from a very young age.  Hirschfeld (1995) explains that 
past research in this area measured constancy by asking children if a certain property is 
essential to a person’s identity. These types of studies typically involve a comparison of 
children’s judgments about the possibility of racial change by altering nonessential cues 
(e.g., dress) with judgments about the possibility of racial change by altering essential 
features (e.g., skin color). Hirschfeld argues that while these studies use properties that 
are familiar to children, they do not involve transformations that are unfamiliar to them. 
For example, children may understand that skin color is important to determining racial 
identity, however, the actual transformation, a European American changing into a 
person of African American appearance, is outside their realm of experience. From this, 
Hirschfeld argues past research may underestimate children’s understanding of race 
because subjects have been asked to determine a person’s identity while relying on 
unfamiliar changes in the person’s appearance.  In one particular study, Hirschfeld (1995) 
presented children with a triad of pictures including a target and two comparison pictures. 
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The target picture depicted an adult, whose race, occupation, and body build were all 
portrayed. Each of the comparison pictures showed children that matched the target on 
two out of the three properties. For example, one comparison might match by occupation 
and body build while the other comparison would match by body build and race. 
Hirschfeld found that 3-, 4-, and 7-year-old children selected a comparison picture that 
racially matched the target more often than they selected the picture matching the targets 
physique or occupation. He interprets these results to support his claim that young 
children do in fact essentialize race just as adults do. It is arguable that the pictures 
presented could just have easily been associated together based on color rather than race. 
The unrealistic nature of the stimuli makes the color of the drawings a more salient factor 
when determining similarities than does body build or occupation. Past research has 
shown that young children do in fact use color as an important factor while sorting 
objects (Sugarman, 1983). To account for the possibility that children were relying on 
color rather than race, Hirschfeld conducted a second experiment. In this experiment, 
children were shown a target picture (e.g., heavyset African American male) and then 
they were shown two comparison pictures. One of the pictures resembled the target based 
on shape (e.g., light colored bulbous car) the other resembled the target based on color 
(e.g., black colored thin car). Hirschfeld found children are no more likely to sort based 
on shared color than based on overall shape. Based on these results, Hirshfeld concluded 
that children as young as three years of age do in fact believe that race is something that 
remains constant (i.e., fixed) regardless of external transformations. From this evidence, 
Hirshfeld suggested that young children rely more on internal properties (i.e., genetics) to 
classify humans into racial categories; therefore, children do essentialize race in ways 
similar to adults. It seems, at best, a stretch to draw support for his overall findings based 
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upon his second experiment.  Skin color is in external attribute, which proves nothing 
about children’s understanding of the internal basis of race. Also as noted, children rely 
on color as an important factor while sorting objects (Sugarman, 1983).  
In a study by Landau, Smith, and Jones (1998), three- and five-year-old children 
were shown a novel object and told it was a “dax.” When given another object of the 
same shape, the toddlers assumed they too were also “daxes,” even if the objects differed 
in size, texture, and color. Based on these conclusions it would seem that shape is also an 
important factor for children when classifying objects. So if both shape and color are 
important for children at this age, it would be probable that significant differences would 
not be found in children’s reliance upon them when sorting objects, which is exactly what 
Hirschfield (1995) found. His findings have often been criticized due to the unrealistic 
nature of the stimuli presented. Hirschfeld used drawings of figures rather than actual 
pictures to illustrate changes in appearance. Madole and Oakes (1999b) review a body of 
research, which shows that the type of stimuli used can influence whether subjects will 
base decisions upon perceptual or conceptual characteristics when classifying objects. 
This support, along with a body of contradictory evidence, raises serious questions about 
Hirschfield’s study and the validity of its findings. Consequently, due to the conflicting 
evidence presented by Hirschfeld (1995), more work should be done in this area to help 
clarify a developmental shift from perceptual to conceptual cues in race constancy.  
As previously mentioned, natural kinds such as humans: 1) remain fixed 
regardless of external transformations, and 2) allow for inductive inferences to be made 
about characteristics of that category’s members. Research has shown that while adults 
essentialize race, children do not develop a more conceptual understanding of race 
constancy until around 8 years of age (Aboud, 1988; Glerum, 2002; Madole et al., 1999; 
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Semaj 1980).  Although a conceptual, “essence-like” understanding of certain entities 
might be an important factor for categorization, we have not yet explored their inductive 
potential. More specifically, we have not yet addressed the extent to which children use 
race as a method of drawing inductive inferences. Although there has been a great deal of 
research on children’s use of categories to make inductive inferences, most have only 
addressed this issue within the domain of objects and animals. The research that does 
involve human categories has been limited due to methodological issues. These issues as 
well as the relevant literature will now be reviewed further.  
Research has already shown that children essentialize animal categories, thus 
treating them as natural kinds (Diesendruck et al., 1998; Keil, 1989).  Gelman and 
Markman (1986; 1987) addressed the question of the inductive potential of animal 
categories in children. In each trial children were shown two pictures of different animals 
and told a new fact about each one. A third picture was presented that looked very much 
like one of the first two objects but was given the same category label as the other one. 
Next, children were asked to infer which of the facts characterized the third picture, based 
on the two previous pictures. For example, on one trial children saw a tropical fish and 
were told that it breathed under water. Next they saw a dolphin and were told that it could 
not breathe under water. Then they were shown another fish, a shark, and had to decide 
how it would breath. Results indicated that when provided with labels, children drew 
inferences based on category membership rather than the physical similarity between 
them. Heyman and Gelman (2000a) extended this methodology to study the inductive 
power of personality traits in humans. Children were asked to make inferences about 
novel psychological properties, such as the type of game a child likes to play, using either 
trait label information or physical appearance. Three pictures were presented on each 
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trial, two comparison pictures and a target. One picture matched the target by physical 
appearance and the other matched by a labeled trait. Again when provided with labels, 
researchers found that children viewed trait information as holding greater inductive 
potential in making inductive inferences than physical similarity.  
Diesendruck and HaLevi (2006) using a similar methodology found that when 
making inductive inferences both children and adults preferred social categories such as 
gender, social status, religiousness, and ethnicity over personality traits such as being 
nice, shy, artistic, and active. Furthermore, of the four social categories listed, children 
only consistently made inferences based on ethnicity and social status. Although this 
study answers several questions concerning which social categories are most influential 
when making inferences, it raises some additional questions at the same time. Do 
children rely more heavily on certain social categories than others when making inductive 
inferences?  
Research suggests children draw from various social categories when making 
inductive inferences. For example, Verkuyten, Masson, and Elffers (1995) found that 
children used skin color and sex more than facial expression when sorting photos into 
categories.  In the same study however, children relied on sex, but not race or facial 
expression, when explaining a story character’s behavior (Verkuyten et al. 1995). It is 
evident from these studies that children do not make categorical decisions and inductive 
inferences based solely upon appearance. To the contrary, it seems children are using a 
more conceptual, systematic understanding of social categories.  
As evidenced by the research findings above, most studies involving category-
based inferences use a similar experimental design. A triad of pictures is shown, two of 
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which are comparisons and the remaining is a target. The target picture typically has one 
characteristic in common with each of the comparison pictures while differing on 
another. Children are then told novel attributes about each comparison picture and then 
asked to decide which is also true of the target. To illustrate, recall in Heyman and 
Gelman (2000a) subjects were shown a triad of pictures. One comparison picture 
matched the target in appearance but differed in behavioral trait while the other one 
matched the target by behavioral trait but differed in appearance. Subjects were then told 
that picture 1 likes to play “tibbits” and picture 2 liked to play “jimjams”. Next, the 
subjects were asked whether the target would rather play “tibbits” or “jimjams”. Subjects 
could either make decisions based upon physical similarity or shared behavioral trait. As 
discussed, in this case, behavioral traits were a more powerful factor in making 
inferences than physical similarity.  
Although this methodology has broadened the field’s understanding of children’s 
inductive inferences, it is not without limitations. For example, the majority of research 
using this methodology employs labels in order to convey differences/commonalities 
between the comparison pictures. Heyman and Gelman (2000a) used labels in order to 
indicate personality traits (e.g., this girl is shy/outgoing). Similarly, Diesendruck and 
HaLevi (2004) used labels in order to indicate both personality trait (i.e., nice/not nice; 
shy/friendly; artistic/ not artistic; active/quiet) and social category (i.e., boy/girl; 
rich/poor; religious/secular; Jewish/Arabic). Heyman and Gelman (1999) argued that 
personality trait labels such a nice/mean can affect the way behavior is interpreted and the 
inferences drawn from those labels. Due to the vast amount of research that has shown 
that using labels can have significant effects on the inferences children make (Deak & 
Bauer, 1996; Diesendruck & HaLevi, 2006; Gelman, 1988; Gelman & Heyman, 1999; 
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Gelman, Star, & Flukes, 2002; Heyman & Gelman, 1998, 1999, 2000a, 2000b; Sloutsky 
& Fisher, 2004), drawing definitive conclusions from these studies can be problematic. 
 A second problem with research within this area deals with the nature of the 
stimuli used. Most studies exploring social categorization and inference development 
among children have used drawings of stimuli rather than actual pictures (Augoustinons 
& Rosewarne, 2001; Bigler & Liben, 1993; Diesendruck & HaLevi, 2004; Heyman & 
Gelman, 2000a, 2000b). In a study by Deak and Bauer (1996), researchers found that the 
stimuli used in categorization studies affected what type of inferences children made. For 
example, children made significantly more category-based inferences when physical 
objects were used during comparisons as opposed to line drawings (Deak & Bauer, 
1996). These findings raise questions regarding the validity of studies using drawings as 
their stimuli, which unfortunately encompasses much of the research in this area.  
 Two separate studies by Madole, Eastman, Stone, and White (2005) attempted to 
resolve the problems mentioned above by using the same triad picture design, but the 
stimuli were actual pictures rather than drawings. Unlike previous studies, the 
comparison pictures were three children from the same social category being illustrated 
rather than a single picture. Madole et al. (2005) only focused on the inductive power of 
social categories that could be compared visually between the target and both sets of 
comparisons, essentially eliminating the need for labels. These social categories, which 
remained ambiguous and were not explicitly stated, included sex, age, and race. In 
determining the inductive potential of race versus sex, one set of comparison pictures was 
of Black males while the other was of White females. The target picture was of a Black 
female, so children could make a social category inference based on either race or sex. In 
addition, the study did not use labels to identify comparisons; they were simply referred 
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to as kids or people. Researchers were also interested in whether the type of characteristic 
used (i.e., social, biological, or individual) to describe the comparison pictures influenced 
which social category would be used when making inductive inferences. Will children 
make more inferences based on race for biological characteristics, such as the type of 
blood someone has, or will they make more for individual characteristics, such as what 
type of food someone likes? Also, Madole et al. (2005) examined the prevalence of social 
category-based inferences among three different age groups of children to explore 
whether developmental changes caused certain social categories to be used more than 
others when making inferences. Participants for study 1 were children of faculty at 
Western Kentucky University separated into three different age groups (5-7, 8-10, 18-21 
year-olds). Researchers found that youngest children in the sample made more inferences 
based on sex than older children. They also found that for participants 8 years old and 
older, the specific attribute being used for the comparison pictures (i.e., social, individual, 
biological) did influence which social category was used for making inferences. Age-
based inferences were applied mainly to individual preferences, sex-based inferences 
were applied to biological attributes, and race-based inferences were applied to social 
attributes. 
The second study of Madole et al. (2005) made various changes to the stimuli and 
utilized a different sample. Several of the comparison questions were changed and real 
words were used instead of nonsense words for all trials. Children from various after 
school programs in Bowling Green, Kentucky participated in this study. Results showed 
that younger children were just as likely to use sex as a means of making inferences as 
older age groups. Younger children responded similarly to older children in the second 
study in that they were also influenced by the specific attribute being used for the 
  
 15
 
comparison pictures (i.e., social, individual, biological) when making inferences. Age-
based inferences were applied mainly to individual preferences, sex-based inferences 
were applied to biological attributes, and race-based inferences were applied to social 
attributes. Therefore, the developmental change in the use of social categories to draw 
inferences between the two studies remains unclear.  
Based upon these previous research findings, the proposed study has three objectives, 
all of which are designed to increase our knowledge of how children understand race and 
their use of race as a means of drawing inferences about novel situations. The study is 
composed of two separate tasks, each answering different questions. 
 In the inference task, we seek to answer the questions, are the inferences we make 
about others influenced by the person’s age, sex, or race? How often do children use race 
as a factor when drawing inductive inferences as opposed to other social categories? Are 
there developmental changes in the use of social categories to draw inferences? Results 
from Madole et al. (2005) remain unclear regarding any developmental changes. Past 
research (Taylor & Gelman, 1993) results did confirm that children used social categories 
other than sex in order to draw inferences. The first goal of the current study is to confirm 
children’s use of different social categories as a method of drawing inductive inferences 
as well as help clarify any developmental shifts taking place regarding the use of 
particular categories while making such inferences. 
 In the essentialist task, I want to see whether the age of participants influences how 
likely they are to accept transformations for all story types. Would the type of story 
influence how likely participants are to accept the transformation? Are children willing to 
say that an individual can change his/her race simply by changing his/her appearance? In 
other words at what age do children see race as fixed or constant regardless of changes to 
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external features? At what age do children abandon external perceptual characteristics in 
order to define race and instead develop a more conceptual, “theory-like”, understanding? 
Although the research is debated, one body has argued that this cognitive shift from a 
perceptual to conceptual understanding of race begins taking place between the 2nd and 
4th grades (Glerum, 2002; Madole et al., 1999), while the other argues a “common sense” 
understanding of race is present at a much younger age (Hirshfeld, 1994). A second goal 
of this study is to replicate the results found by Glerum (2002) and Madole et al. (1999). 
Replicating these results would help clarify this area of development by confirming that 
children between 7 and 8 years of age view race as a natural kind, that is, immutable and 
essential to identity (Madole et al., 1999). Assuming these results are replicated, building 
from these findings, I argue that children who are more likely to say that race remains 
constant regardless of external changes, that is view race as a natural kind, will also use 
race more often than other social categories when making inferences about other people.  
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Method 
Participants 
 Eleven 6-7 year olds (mean age 7:0), 25 8-9 year olds (mean age 9:2), and 11 10-
12 year olds (mean age 11:5) involved in after school programs from elementary schools 
in the Bowling Green, Kentucky area participated in this study. Twenty-two of the 
participants were female and 25 were male. Less than 1% of the participants were other 
than European American (African American n = 2, Middle Eastern n = 1). Approximately 
283 students were enrolled in the after school programs. In order to obtain parental 
permission, letters of informed consent were placed in each individual student’s mailbox 
enrolled in the after school program (Appendix A). Sixteen percent of students returned 
their consent form, all granting permission to participate in the study. Twenty-five 
percent of students attending schools that participated in this study were on free or 
reduced lunches. The Bowling Green City school board was contacted for permission in 
order to carry out testing within the school system. Testing was conducted in the 
afternoons after school has dismissed. Permission to conduct research during the after 
school programs was obtained from the directors of each individual school’s program 
Inference Task   
Stimuli 
 During the first phase of testing, the researcher used a picture album replicated 
from Madole et al. (2005) in order to present comparison triads and target pictures to 
each participant. The comparison triads consisted of three individual photographs pasted 
onto a 4 x 6 inch index card and placed within each section of the photo album. Each 
individual photograph was obtained from high school yearbooks and web-based 
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modeling agencies and measured approximately 2 x 1.5 inches. Examples of the 
comparison triads are available in Appendix B.  
Design and Procedure 
Children were tested in the afternoon during their after school program at the 
school they attend. Testing sessions were scheduled based upon availability and 
convenience for both the child and program director. Data was collected from each 
individual child in two separate, 10-15 minute sessions, which took place over two days. 
Each session was conducted in the most private space available at that time. Before each 
session began, each child was informed that his or her parents had granted permission for 
him/her to participate. The basic instructions of the task were explained and children 
were given opportunities to ask questions. They were told that their participation was 
voluntary, and that they could quit anytime they wanted without penalty. Next, they were 
asked to sign an assent form indicating their willingness to participate. After receiving 
their assent, the children were given a more detailed set of instructions dependent upon 
which phase of the study was being conducted. In both phases children were seated either 
across or beside the examiner. 
  The inference task consisted of 24 trials. In each trial, participants were shown 
two comparison triads and a target picture. There were eight combinations that were used 
for the comparison triads and target pictures: young White females, young White males, 
young Black females, young Black males, older White females, older White males, older 
Black females, and older Black males. Each picture within the triad comparisons was 
from the same social category. Triads were constructed so that no two were identical and 
each one would contain a different combination of photos as well as different orders. A 
sentence was read describing a characteristic of each triad and then participants were 
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asked which characteristic the target possessed.  These sentences were completely 
identical with the exception of one word. For example, an individual characteristic trial 
might read, “These kids like to convivial in their free time” while “These kids like to 
partition in their free time.” The participants were shown the target picture and were 
asked, “Does this kid like to convivial or partition in their free time?”  Unfamiliar, 
advanced vocabulary words were used in place of age appropriate words to prevent 
participants from making inferences based on pre-existing knowledge or stereotypes. For 
example, “these kids like to convivial/partition in their free time” were used as opposed 
to activities such as basketball or reading.   
There were three different types of trials: 1) age versus race, in which the triad 
and target pictures were the same in terms of sex, 2) age versus sex, in which the pictures 
were the same in terms of race, and 3) race versus sex, in which the pictures were the 
same in terms of age.  In each trial, the target would share one social attribute with each 
triad and would differ on the other.  For example, a sex versus race trial might include 
one triad of older White males and the other triad of older Black females, with an older 
Black male as the target. In this example, age is constant between all pictures but the 
target is White like the first triad and the same gender as the second triad. There were 
also six control measures in order to make sure that participants were paying attention 
and not choosing randomly. Participants were expected to make two control inferences 
for each type of social category (i.e., race, sex, and age). For example, “These kids drive 
cars/bikes” and “These kids go to bed early/late” were used as age control sentences in 
which participants were expected to make inferences based on age. The sentences that 
were used in each trial and their characteristic type are available in Appendix C.    
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Trials were presented in a quasi random order, in order to make sure that no more 
than two types of trials (i.e., age versus sex, race versus sex, or race versus age), 
characteristic types (i.e., individual, social, and biological) or social category of pictures 
(i.e., young black females/males, old white females/male) were presented consecutively. 
All subjects received the same order of trials, which is available in Appendix D.  
Essentialism Task 
Stimuli 
 During the essentialism task the researcher presented stories adapted from Glerum 
(2002) to communicate various changes to an object, animal, or person. A pre- and post- 
transformation picture of the object, animal, or person accompanied each story. The 
stories and accompanying pictures are available in Appendix E. Object change stories 
began by describing the function of the target object without specifically naming it. Next, 
various changes were described, which caused the function of the object to change as 
well. The child was then asked what they thought the object was, “still a bucket/lantern, 
or is it now a flower pot/birdfeeder?”    
 Animal change stories were written and were presented in a similar fashion. The 
stories introduced the animal as exhibiting behaviors characteristic of certain animals 
from birth (i.e., horses), but did not label them specifically as that animal. Next, after a 
visit to the veterinarian, the animal was given the wrong medicine, which caused various 
changes to the animal. The child was then asked what they thought the animal was, “still 
a horse/tiger, or is it now a zebra/lion?”  
 People change stories began by introducing a person as either white or black in 
appearance. The person was described as looking and acting like “most black/white 
boys/girls” while growing up. Next, a visit to the doctor was described, during which the 
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doctor made various changes to the person in order for them to resemble the opposite 
ethnicity. The child was then asked what they thought the person was now, “still a 
black/white person, or now a white/black person?”  
 Object and animal “before” and “after” photos were obtained from on-line 
websites using the search engines Google and Yahoo. Photos of people were obtained 
from high school yearbooks. The photos were manipulated using morphing software 
(e.g., Morph X) available on-line in order for race changes to seem more plausible. All 
pictures were printed onto plain paper at a size of approximately 3 x 5 inches. The 
pictures were also laminated to increase durability and prevent wear. 
 Design and Procedure  
 During phase two, each child was read eight brief stories describing a change in 
the physical appearance of an animal, object, or person. Four of the stories involved 
changes of physical characteristics that typically identify a person’s race. The four 
remaining object and animal stories were used as control conditions. Each child received 
all possible race transformation combinations in terms of direction of change (i.e., white 
to black or black to white) and stimulus gender. 
 The stories were presented in a quasi-random order such that no more than one 
control or race story were presented consecutively. Appendix F lists the order in which 
the stories were presented. At the conclusion of each story, participants were asked to 
verbally indicate the category membership of the stimulus (i.e., is this person still a black 
person, or is he now a white person), and their responses were recorded accordingly. 
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Results 
 
Data obtained from African American participants were omitted due to the low 
number of participants (N = 2). Data were omitted because African Americans’ 
understanding of race could possibly be different from European Americans’ 
understanding; thus, altering the results.  
Inference Task 
For the inference task, each trial was followed by a question allowing participants 
to make an inference based on the sex, age, or race of the target picture. Control stories 
were omitted; therefore, a minimum of 0 and a maximum of 12 inferences could be made 
for each social category (i.e., race, sex, and age). I predicted a main effect of attribute 
type when making inferences; thus, the specific type of attribute (i.e., individual, social, 
and biological) would influence which social category would be used for making 
inferences. Specifically age-based inferences were predicted to be applied mainly to 
individual preferences, sex-based inferences to biological attributes, and race-based 
inferences to social attributes. The number of race based inferences, sex based inferences, 
and age based inferences was analyzed using three separate 3 (Age group: 6-7, 8-9 and 
10-12) x 3 (Attribute type: individual, biological, and social) mixed model ANOVAS. 
Age group was a between subject variable and attribute type was a within subject 
variable. 
The analysis of race based inferences resulted in a main effect of Attribute Type, 
F(2 ,84) = 8.16, p < .01. Children were less likely to make inferences based on race on 
Individual trials (M = 1.67) than either Social F(2,84) = 11.61, p < .01 or Biological 
F(2,84) = 12.84, p < .01 trials.  
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Figure 1.  Race Based Inferences 
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Analysis of age based inferences resulted in a main effect of Attribute Type, 
F(2,84 ) =10.28, p < .01. Children were more likely to make inferences based on age on 
Individual trials (M = 2.73) than either Social F(2,84) = 12.43 (M = 2.00) or Biological 
F(2,84) = 17.99 (M = 2.00) trials. 
Figure 2. Age Based Inferences 
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Analysis of sex based inferences resulted in no main effect of Age, F(2,4) =1.29, 
p =  .29. Analysis of sex based inferences also resulted in no main effect of Attribute, 
F(2,4) = .15, p = .86. 
Essentialism Task  
For the essentialism task, each story was followed by a question in order to 
measure whether children thought category membership had changed. Each child was 
given a score of 1 for each response that indicated a change in category membership and 
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a score of 0 for each response that indicated that category membership did not change. 
Therefore, lower scores indicated that children essentialized the membership of that 
category. Given that there were two stories of each, animal and artifact transformation 
stories had a minimum score of 0 and a maximum score of 2.  
Because previous studies have found a main effect of direction of transformation 
(Glerum, 2002) the four race change stories were broken down into two white to black 
transformations and two black to white transformations. Thus, each direction of 
transformation had a minimum score of 0 and a maximum score of 2. 
The first analysis examined whether change scores were significantly different 
across the four types of transformation stories. Previous research has reported that 
children begin to essentialize animal category membership by age seven (Keil, 1989) and 
racial category membership around the fourth grade (Glerum, 2002; Madole et al., 1999). 
I hypothesized that this finding would be replicated, arguing that older children were less 
likely to accept transformations than younger children. Second, I predicted that there 
would also be a main effect of story type. That is, participants would say that artifacts 
could change category membership but animals and people could not. In order to evaluate 
these hypotheses, scores were entered into a 3 (age group: 6-7, 8-9, and 10-12) x 4 (story 
type: artifact, animal, black to white, and white to black) repeated measures ANOVA.  
The analysis resulted in a main effect of Age, F(2,6) = 3.29, p < .05. Younger 
children (M = 1.70) were more likely to say that an object, animal, or person changed 
their category membership than were 8-9 year old children (M = 1.17), F (1,42) = 5.32, p 
< .01. Also, 6-7 year old children were more likely to say that an object, animal, or 
person changed their starting category than were the oldest children (M = 1.08), F(1,42) 
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= 5.19. Eight to nine year old children did not differ significantly from 10-12 year old 
children, F(1,42) = .17, p = .68. 
Figure 3. Main effect of age 
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The analysis also resulted in a main effect of Story Type, F(1,126) = 5.76, p < 
.01. Artifact (M = 1.69) change scores were higher than Animal change scores (M = 
1.16), F(1,126) = 7.79, p < .01. Artifact change scores were higher than scores for stories 
involving black to white transformations (M = 1.11) or white to black transformations (M 
= 1.11), F(2,126) = 17.03, p < .01.  Stories involving animals did not differ significantly 
from stories involving black to white transformations or white to black transformations 
F(2,126) = .82, p = .37. 
Figure 4. Main effect of Story Type 
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The ANOVA did not reveal a significant Story Type x Age interaction F(6,126) = 
1.64, p = .14; however the means suggested that the youngest children did not 
discriminate between story types in their responses to the same extent as older children. 
The graph below shows the means of each Story Type change scores for each group. The 
lack of a significant interaction is probably due to the low number of 6-7 year old 
children in the sample (n = 11).  Exploration of this effect was not the primary goal of the 
current study. 
Figure 5. Story Type x Age Interaction 
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The primary focus of this study was to determine if children who had a better 
understanding of race constancy would use race as a more salient social category when 
making inductive inferences about others. In order to evaluate this hypothesis the 
relationship between the transformation and inference task needed to be determined. 
Younger children’s data was excluded because results showed that age group was 
responding differently than older children. As reported, they were more likely to say that 
objects, animals, and people could change category membership than older participants; 
therefore, they were not discriminating between what could change and what could not, 
resulting in low variability. 
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A Pearson’s correlation was used to determine whether there was a relationship 
between children’s race change score (0-4) from the essentialist task and number of 
inferences (0-12) made for each type of social category (i.e., race sex, or age). Therefore, 
race change scores were separately correlated with the number of race-based inferences, 
sex based inferences, and age based inferences. I expected a negative correlation between 
race change scores and race based inferences, specifically that children who had low race 
change scores would be more likely to use race when making inductive inferences. The 
results are reported in the table below. 
Table 1 
 
Correlations Between Race Change Scores and Social Category Inferences 
 
 
      
Attribute Type  Control  Individual  Social  Biological   Combined 
 
Race-Based Inferences 
 
Race Change Score  -0.32*    -0.18 -0.18    -0.31*      -0.33* 
____________________________________________________________________________ 
 
Age-Base Inferences 
 
Race Change Score      0.29     -0.02 -0.22    -0.03       -0.02 
____________________________________________________________________________ 
 
Sex-Based Inferences 
 
Race Change Score      0.03       0.18   0.41**      0.34*        0.37* 
 
 
** significant at .01 
* significant at .05 
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Table 1 shows that children who had lower race change scores made more race-
based inferences for biological attributes and the overall combined trials. Thus children 
who are more likely to essentialize race, are also more likely to use race as a means of 
drawing inductive inferences. This table also shows that children who had lower race 
change scores made fewer inferences based on sex on three types of attributes, not just 
social and biological t(33) = 2.58, p = .01, t(33) = 2..07, p = .05, t(33) = 2.36, p = .02.  
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Discussion 
 
 The results of this study provided support for several of my predictions but also 
yielded some unexpected results. With regard to the transformation task, I hypothesized 
that younger children would be more likely to accept transformations than older children. 
This hypothesis was confirmed. Older children were more resistant that category 
membership could change than were younger children. The results of this study show that 
a better understanding of constancy seems to occur between the ages of 7 and 8. These 
findings are consistent with the line of research that supported the idea that young 
children gradually develop an understanding of racial categories (Aboud, 1988; Glerum, 
2002; Madole et al. 1999; Semaj 1980) as opposed to possessing an innate adult-like, 
“common-sense,” theory of race as proposed by Hirschfeld, (1995, 1996).  
I also hypothesized a difference in the four story types. This hypothesis was also 
confirmed. Artifacts were viewed as the most likely to change category membership, 
followed by animals, and people were viewed as the least likely to change category 
membership. The results from both of these hypotheses are consistent with previous 
findings (Glerum, 2002; Madole et al., 1999). Also, these findings offer continued 
support for the body of literature (Aboud, 1988; Glerum, 2002; Madole et al., 1999; 
Semaj, 1980) arguing that children develop a gradual understanding of racial categories. 
The main effect of age clearly shows a developmental shift in cognitive functioning, 
rather than children possessing an adult-like, “common sense” theory of race from a 
young age as Hirschfeld (1995, 1996) suggests. Although these findings do assist with 
that debate, more research is needed to explore what exactly causes this change in 
conceptual understanding to occur. For example, can children’s understanding of 
category membership be attributed to nature, nurture, or an interaction of both as Piaget’s 
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theory of cognitive development argues? Do we learn the properties of category 
membership simply through experience? Does something change neurologically such as 
the frontal lobes or limbic system, both of which play a role in our behavior and 
understanding of many social experiences? Piaget’s theory of cognitive development 
contends that nature and nurture interact to produce cognitive development. In this view, 
nurture includes every kind of experience the child encounters and nature includes the 
child’s maturing brain and body. Piaget’s concrete operational stage coincides with our 
findings. In this stage, which occurs between the ages of 7 to 12, children learn to reason 
logically about concrete objects and events. The concept of conservation becomes more 
established, which is the idea that merely changing the appearance of objects does not 
change their key properties (Siegler, DeLoache, and Eisenberg, 2003). Although a Story 
Type x Age Interaction was not found, the lack of a significant effect was most likely due 
to the low number of younger participants. Future research should include a larger sample 
of younger children in order to explore whether this effect would be significant.  
With regard to the inference task, I hypothesized that the specific type of attribute 
(i.e., individual, social, biological) would influence which social category would used for 
making inferences. Specifically, I predicted that age-based inferences would be applied 
mainly to individual preferences, sex-based inferences would be applied to biological 
attributes, and race-based inferences would be applied to social attributes. Only two of 
these hypotheses were supported. Children were most likely to make race-based 
inferences based on Social trials, followed by Biological trials and least likely to make 
race-based inferences on Individual trials. Also, children were more likely to make age-
based inferences on Individual trials than either Social or Biological trials. There were no 
differences between the trials for sex-based inferences. This finding sheds light on the 
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developmental changes in the use of social categories. Although these findings are 
inconsistent with Madole et al. (2005) which found that the youngest children in the 
sample made more inferences based on sex than older children, they are consistent with 
the replicated study that found younger children were just as likely to use sex as a means 
of making inferences as older age groups. Analysis of sex-based inferences also resulted 
in no main effect of Attribute. This finding is also inconsistent with Madole et al. (2005), 
which found in both studies that sex-based inferences were applied to biological 
attributes. 
  These findings not only raise additional questions but open the door for future 
research. Why is it that children would make more age-based inferences for individual 
attributes as opposed to biological or social? Could it be that so much of children’s 
individual behaviors is based on their age (e.g., eating habits, hobbies, and interests) it is 
only natural for children to make age-based inferences for individual attributes? Why is it 
that children would make more race-based inferences for social attributes as opposed to 
biological or individual? I believe society and the way race is portrayed in movies, 
magazines, and other media turns race into a social construct. Consequently, we use race 
much more when making inferences about things that are social in nature, for example 
the locations of where black or white people may or may not live.  
The main purpose of this study was to determine if children’s understanding of 
race constancy would influence their use of race when making inductive inferences. I 
hypothesized that children who had a better understanding of race constancy would also 
use race as a more salient factor when making inductive inferences. This hypothesis was 
supported. Children who essentialized race more were also more likely to use race as a 
means of making inductive inferences. Future research should revolve around answering 
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why this occurs. Is this pattern specific to race or do these findings also repeat with sex? 
Will one’s understanding of sex constancy also influence the number of sex-based 
inferences that are made?  
 It is interesting that children who were more likely to say that a person could 
change his/her race were also making more inferences based on sex on all three types of 
attributes. In this case, children are not essentializing race or treating it in a manner 
consistent with “psychological essentialism.” As mentioned in the introduction, natural 
kinds such as humans: 1) remain fixed regardless of external transformations, and 2) 
allow for inductive inferences to be made about characteristics of that category’s 
members. However, if children are not viewing race as remaining fixed, they will be less 
likely to use race as a means of drawing inductive inferences. More research should be 
conducted to investigate the reasoning behind this finding. Because previous research has 
found that race constancy develops somewhat later than gender constancy, which occurs 
between the ages of 5 and 7 (Aboud, 1983; Bem, 1989; Clark, et al., 1980; Semaj, 1980), 
it might be possible that children who do not yet have an understanding of race constancy 
will use something that they do believe to be fixed and unchanging. Results from Madole 
et al., (2005) support this possibility. Researchers found that the youngest children in the 
sample (i.e., 5-7 year olds) made more inferences based on sex than older children, and as 
we have seen, race constancy does not develop until 7-8 years old. Future research could 
investigate this possibility by pairing another test of race constancy such as the sorting 
tasks reviewed by Aboud (1988) with the inference task used in this study. As mentioned, 
Semaj (1980) argues that until children are able to classify people according to their 
ethno-racial group, children will not be able to achieve racial constancy.   
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 To summarize, the evidence presented here showed that children who were more 
likely to view race in way consistent with “psychological essentialism” were also more 
likely to use race as a means of making inductive inferences. Therefore, as children began 
to develop an understanding of race constancy, they tend to use race as a means of 
assuming things about others. Since we know this shift in thinking takes place, for most, 
between the ages of seven and eight, educators can use this information to develop 
awareness programs accordingly. The research presented here shows that awareness 
programs are needed at a much earlier grade level than high school or college. If such 
programs can be implemented, perhaps children will change the assumptions they make 
and consequently the prejudices that evolve from them.    
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Informed Consent Form 
Dear Parent/Guardian: 
 We would like to ask for your help in a study of children’s understanding of 
categories. Dr. Kelly Madole and Casey Dawson of Western Kentucky University are 
conducting this study in cooperation with your child’s after school program The purpose 
of our study is to better understand how children think about and categorize the people in 
their world. We will coordinate each session in cooperation with the director of each after 
school program to ensure that your child does not miss any important learning or social 
activities. Your child will receive a small token for participating.  
  
If you decide to take part, your child will participate individually in two 15-20 
minute sessions that are conducted over two days during their after-school program.  
During the initial session, your child will be read (or read depending on preference) eight 
brief stories describing animals, objects, and people who experience some type of change 
in their physical appearance. After each story is read, your child will then decide whether 
the object, animal, or person has really changed. During the second session, your child 
will be read simple, brief sentences about people. He or she will be asked to respond to 
some questions based on their beliefs about the kinds of things these people like to do, or 
how they behave.  In particular we are interested in children’s beliefs about the kinds of 
characteristics members of different categories share.  
  
We emphasize that your child’s participation is entirely voluntary. If you or your 
child decides not to participate, there will be no negative consequences for you or your 
child in any way. Your child has the right to refuse to answer any question and may 
withdraw from the study at any time. All information will be kept strictly confidential. 
Your child’s name will only appear on the consent forms The results may be part of a 
published manuscript in which all results would be reported in terms of group averages, 
and no children will ever be identified by name. 
  
The procedures in this study have been reviewed and approved by the Western 
Kentucky University Committee for the Protection for Human Research Participants. 
Furthermore, the University has filed a form called “Assurance of Compliance with 
DHHD regulations for the Protection of Human Subjects” with the Department of Health 
and Human Services.                    
 
Specific questions about this study may be directed to Dr. Kelly Madole, 
Research Director for this project at (270) 745-6475. We will be happy to answer any 
questions of concerns that you may have regarding this study. Please leave a message if 
no one is there.   
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We hope that you will allow your child to participate in our study and help us 
explore this area of development. We promise that it will be a pleasant experience for 
them and not interfere in any way with their academic or social activities. If you agree to 
participate, please fill in the  
required information below. Regardless of your decision to allow your child to 
participate, upon returning this letter to the after school director your child will receive a 
small token of our appreciation for you and your child’s time. Thank you for your help.  
 
Sincerely,  
 
Kelly Madole, Ph.D. 
Research Director 
 
 
Casey Dawson 
Graduate Student 
 
 
 
Western Kentucky University  
 
Parental Consent Form 
 
Child’s name:____________________________________________________________  
 
 
Date of Birth:____________________________________________________________ 
 
 
School:_________________________________________________________________ 
 
 
________ No. I do not give my permission for my child to participate in this study. 
 
 
________Yes. I have read the information provided about this study, and give my 
consent for my child to participate in this study conducted by Dr. Kelly Madole and 
Casey Dawson of Western Kentucky University. I understand that the anonymity and 
security of data will be maintained. I also understand that I may withdraw my child from 
the study at any time without penalty.  
 
Parent/Guardian 
signature:_______________________________________________________________ 
 
 
Date:___________________________________________________________________ 
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Child/Minor Assent Form 
I,___________________________________________________ understand that my 
parents have said that it is okay for me to take part in a project  about what kinds of 
things can change and what kinds of things go together with Kelly Madole and Casey 
Dawson. 
 
I am taking part because I want to. Also, I have been told that I can stop any time I want 
to and nothing will happen to me if I want to stop. 
 
 
______________________________________ 
Signature 
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 Young White Male     Young Black Male 
 
        
 
 
 
 
 
 Older White Male     Older Black Male 
 
   
 
 
 
 
 
 
 Young White Females    Young Black Females 
 
               
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 Older White Female     Older Black Female 
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Appendix C 
 
Inference Sentences 
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1). These kids go to bed early. These people go to be late. Does this person go to bed 
early or late? (Age control)   
 
2). These kids have dark skinned mommies and daddies. These kids have light skinned 
mommies and daddies. Does this kids have dark or light skinned mommies and 
daddies? (Race control) 
 
3). These people go to pink bathrooms at school. These kids go to blue bathrooms at 
school. Does this person go to the pink or blue bathrooms at school? (Sex control)  
  
4). These kids favorite books are about dowers. These kids favorite books are about 
lapidaries. Is this kid’s favorite book about dowers or lapidaries? (Individual) 
 
5). These people have an inflective body. These kids have a jiving body. Does this kid 
have an inflective or jiving body? (Biological) 
 
6). These kids favorite food are udons. These peoples favorite are patinas. Is this person’s 
favorite food udons or patinas? (Individual) 
 
7). These peoples families all talk puritanical. These peoples families all talk alliterative.  
Does this person’s family all talk puritanical or alliterative? (Social) 
 
8). These kids have a finicky scalp. These people have a nascent scalp. Does this person 
have a finicky or nascent scalp? (Biological) 
 
9). These peoples families all have precepts in their homes. These kid’s families all have 
marimbas in their homes. Does this kid’s family have precepts or marimbas in their 
homes? (Social) 
 
10). These people like to learn about riboflavins. These people like to learn about 
quagmires. Does this person like to learn about riboflavins or quagmires? (Individual) 
 
11). These people all have germinal cells. These kids all have renal cells. Does this kid 
have germinal or renal cells? (Biological) 
 
12). These people like to play fighting games. These people like to play with dolls. Does 
this person like to play with fighting games or dolls? (Sex Control) 
 
13). These people all have endogamous DNA. These kids all have virulent DNA. Does 
this kid have endogamous or virulent DNA? (Biological) 
 
14). The kid’s daddies all work at yeddos. These people’s daddies all work at nikkos. 
Does this person’s dad work at yeddos or nikkos? (Social) 
  
 
15). These people like to drink swindlers. These kids like to drink tillets. Does this kid 
like to drink swindlers or tillets? (Individual)  
  
 46
 
 
16). These people have parents who are abrogative. These kids have parents who are 
gimbaled. Does this kid have parents who are abrogative or gimbaled? (Social) 
     
17). These kids all have totemic blood. These kids all have saccadic blood. Does this kid 
have totemic or saccadic blood? (Biological)   
 
18). These people drive cars. These kids ride bikes. Does this kid drive cars or ride bikes?  
(Age Control) 
    
19). These people live on a street where everyone is consorted. These people live on a 
street where everyone is equatorial. Does this person live on a street where everyone 
is consorted or equatorial? (Social) 
    
20). These people like to watch movies about halmas. These kids like to watch movies 
about sagos. Does this kid like to watch movies about halmas or sagos? (Individual)  
  
21). These kids live on a street where all the houses are burnished. These people live on a 
street where all the houses are hermetic.Does this person live on a street where all the 
houses are burnished or hermetic? (Social)     
 
22) These kids like to warble in their free time. These people like to forbade in their free 
time. Does this person like to warble or forbade in their free time? (Individual) 
 
23). These kids have reportorial muscles. These kids have arigato muscles. Does this kid 
have reportorial or arigato muscles? (Biological)     
 
24). These kid’s skin burns easily. These peoples’ skin does not burn easily. Does this 
person’s skin burn easily or not burn easily? (Race Control)  
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Trial type: R v A = race versus age  
 R v S = race versus sex 
 S v A = sex versus age  
 
Types of picture: OWF = old white female  OBF = old black female 
   OWM = old white male  OBM = old black male 
   YWF = young white female YBF = young black female 
   YWM = young black female YBM = young black male 
 
Trial# Trial Type Target Comparison 1 Comparison 2 
1 R v A OWF YWF OBF 
2 R v S YBF YBM YWF    
3 S v A OBM YBF YBM 
4 R v S YBM YBF YWM  
5 R v A YWM OWM YBM 
6 S v A OBF YBF OBM  
7 R v S OBM OBF OWM  
8 S v A OWM YWM OWF    
9 S v A YBM OBM YBF  
10 R v S OWF OWM OBF  
11 R v A YBM OBM YWM 
12 R v S OBF OBM OWF 
13 S v A YWF OWF YWM  
14 R v A OBM YBM OWM 
15 S v A YBF OBF YBM  
16 R v A YWF OWF YBF 
17 R v S YWM YWF YBM 
18 S v A YWM OWM YWF  
19 R v S OWM OWF OBM 
20 R v A YBF OBF YWF 
21 S v A OWF YWF OWM 
22 R v A OWM YWM OBM 
23 R v S YWF YWM YBF 
24 R v A OBF OWF YBF 
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Appendix E 
Transformation Stories and Stimulus pictures 
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When this animal was born, it did things that horses usually do. Here is a 
picture of the animal when it grew up. One day the animal got sick, so the 
vet gave it some medicine. But the medicine was too strong, and it began to 
get black and white stripes and behaved like a zebra. The animal could not 
be changed to be the way it was before. Here is a picture of the animal now. 
If this could happen in real life, would this animal still be a horse, or would 
it now be a zebra? 
 
         
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
           
 
When this animal was born, it did things that tigers usually do. Here is a 
picture of the animal when it grew up. One day the animal got sick, so the 
vet gave it some medicine. But the medicine was too strong, and the animal 
lost its stripes, grew hair around its neck, and behaved like a lion. The 
animal could not be changed to be the way it was before. Here is a picture of 
the animal now. If this could happen in real life, would this animal still be a 
tiger, or would it now be a lion? 
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When this thing was made, it was used to give off light when camping. This 
is a picture of this thing when it was made. Then some people took it. They 
took some pieces off of it, made some other changes, and filled it with seeds. 
None of what they did to it could be changed back again. After they did all 
this, they used it to feed birds. Here is a picture of this thing now. If this 
could happen in real life, would this thing still be a lantern, or would it now 
be a birdfeeder? 
 
                                
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
When this thing was made, it was used to carry water. This is a picture of 
this thing when it was made. Then some people took it. They took some 
pieces off of it, made some other changes, and filled it with soil. None of 
what they did to it could be changed back again. After they did all this, they 
used it to plant flowers. Here is a picture of this thing now. If this could 
happen in real life, would this object still be a bucket, or would it now be a 
flower pot? 
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When Sally was little, she looked like most white people. Her parents were 
white. Here is a picture of Sally when she grew up. After growing up, she 
realized she wanted to be different. One day Sally went to a doctor, who 
changed the way Sally looks. Her skin was made to be darker and her face 
and hair were also changed. None of what the doctor did could be changed 
back. Here is a picture of Sally now. If this could happen in real life, would 
she still be a white person, or would she now be a black person? 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
 
 
When Bruce was little, he looked like most white people. His parents were 
white. Here is a picture of Bruce when he grew up. After growing up, he 
realized he wanted to be different. One day Bruce went to a doctor, who 
changed the way Bruce looks. His skin was made to be darker and his face 
and hair were also changed. None of what the doctor did could be changed 
back. Here is a picture of Bruce now. If this could happen in real life, would 
he still be a white person, or would he now be black person? 
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When Sharon was little, she looked like most black people. Her parents were 
black. Here is a picture of Sharon when she grew up. After growing up, she 
realized she wanted to be different. One day Sharon went to a doctor, who 
changed the way Sharon looks. Her skin was made to be lighter and her face 
and hair were also changed. None of what the doctor did could be changed 
back. Here is a picture of Sharon now. If this could happen in real life, 
would she still be a black person, or would she now be a white person? 
 
             
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
When Billy was little, he looked like most black people. His parents were 
black. Here is a picture of Billy when he grew up. After growing up, he 
realized he wanted to be different. One day Billy went to a doctor, who 
changed the way Billy looks. His skin was made to be lighter and his face 
and hair were also changed. None of what the doctor did could be changed 
back. Here is a picture of Billy now. If this could happen in real life, would 
he still be a black person, or would he now be a white person? 
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Appendix F 
 
Order of Stories 
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Arranged Order    Order drawn at random
 
1). Control Object 1). Bucket to Flower pot transformation   
2). Test  2). Male White to Black transformation   
3). Control Animal  3). Tiger to Lion transformation   
4). Test      4). Female Black to White transformation 
5). Control Object     5). Lantern to Birdfeeder transformation  
6). Test     6). Male Black to White transformation   
7). Control Animal  7). Horse to Zebra transformation 
8). Test     8). Female White to Black transformation 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
